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Well-ordered society—A reasonable agreement on principles of justice
 Dworkin is right that the original position cannot provide an independent justification for 
principles of justice. Yet it does not mean that the idea of social contract is unnecessary in 
Rawls’s theory. 
Indeed, Rawlsian social contract should be interpreted as a social agreement on 
principles of justice among reasonable citizens in a well-ordered society, but not simply a 
hypothetical story which would happen among people who were ignorant of their particular 
information in the original position. 
A well-ordered society represents a kind of ideal society which all reasonable citizens 
seek for a fair scheme of social cooperation. In a well-ordered society, citizens are fully 
informed, but they are also reasonable. They want to cooperate with other fellow citizens 
fairly and seek for public norms which can be justifiable to others. Principles of justice are 
exactly the kind of public norms they are looking for, because these principles can treat 
every citizens fairly and represent a fair scheme of social cooperation. Therefore, in a well-
ordered society, citizens generally accept principles of justice as their public norms. 
The contractarian element in Rawls’ theory is mainly represented by such a social 
agreement in the well-ordered society, but not the hypothetical contract in the original 
position. It represents a political ideal that everyone would accept as long as they want to 
participate in a fair scheme of social cooperation. And it is also an ideal which Rawls wants 
to achieve. 
Original Position
 Many Rawls scholars take the idea of original position as 
the Rawlsian version of social contract. We can imagine an 
‘original position,’ which people were placed behind a veil of 
ignorance.
 Behind the veil of ignorance, people in the original 
position did not know their social status, their race or 
gender, their natural asset, and their conception of the good. 
In such a fair choice situation, people could choose 
principles of justice as the political principles which govern 
the basic structure of their society.  
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Conclusions
Through this interpretation, we can understand 
that the idea of social contract plays a more 
important role in Rawls’ theory than the role that 
many people think. Rawlsian social contract 
should be understood as a general agreement in 
a well-ordered society, and the original position 
is a heuristic device which people in the well-
ordered society would accept if they were 
looking for principles which govern their society. 
Introduction
John Rawls is arguably the most influential political 
philosopher of the twentieth century. In his most seminal 
books, A Theory of Justice (1971), Rawls claims that his aim 
is to ‘present a conception of justice which generalizes and 
carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of 
the social contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau, and 
Kant.’ However, what role does the idea of social contract 
play in Rawls’ theory is rarely discussed among Rawls 
scholars. Some scholars contend that Rawlsian social 
contract is a kind of hypothetical contract which people 
would make behind the ‘veil of ignorance,’ and this idea is 
redundant in Rawls’ theory. In this poster, I would like to 
argue that Rawlsian social contract should rather be 
understood as a social agreement on political principles 
which people would make in a well-ordered society. The 
idea of social contract is necessary because it represents a 
political ideal in Rawls’ mind.
We should imagine that we were in 
an ‘original position’ and chose 
principles of justice behind a ‘veil of 
ignorance.’ The original position is a 
hypothetical choice situation which 
everyone is treated as equals there. 
Original Position—Why is it relevant?
 Some scholars, like Dworkin, criticize that the original 
position cannot justify principles of justice independently, 
therefore the contractarian element is redundant in Rawls’
theory. 
 Dworkin argues that:
(1)In the original position, we were ignorant of their social 
status and natural endowments and would choose in the 
way which Rawls describes. 
(2)Nevertheless, in the real world, we will choose differently, 
for there is no any ‘veil of ignorance’ in the real world and 
we have full information about ourselves. Our choice in 
the real world is different from our choice in the original 
position. 
(3)Therefore, there is no point for us to be bound by an 
hypothetical choice which I would make under a condition 
of much less knowledge. The fact that I would choose 
principles of justice in the original position cannot explain 
why I should follow principles of justice in the real life. The 
original position, which is the representation of Rawlsian
social contract, is merely a redundant hypothetical story.
The fact that I would have agreed if you 
had insisted neither adds nor suggests 
any argument why I should agree now. If 
you had held out for your proposal, and I 
had agreed, I could not say that my 
agreement was in any way nullified or 
called into question because of duress. 
But if I had not in fact agreed, the fact that 
I would have in itself mean nothing.
Ok, now I do not know 
who I am. What 
principles of justice I 
want my society to be 
governed? 
Come on! Why do I 
have to be affected by 
a hypothetical contract 
which I would make 
behind the veil of 
ignorance? 
If you were behind the veil of 
ignorance and ignorant of your 
identity, you would agree with an 
extensive welfare system. Now 
please pay a large amount of tax 
to us. 
Even we know the full information of 
ourselves, we are still willing to be 
bound by the principles of justice, 
because they represent public norms 
which would be accepted by any 
reasonable citizens. 
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Why should I be affected 
by the principles of 
justice, which I would 
have agreed in a never-
happened hypothetical 
situation? 
If the original position 
represents the 
contractarian element in 
Rawls’ theory, then is it 
simply redundant? 
Yes, the original position is hypothetical, but it is 
also a good heuristic device to tell us what 
principles we should follow if we want to live in a 
well-ordered society. If you agree that well-ordered 
society is a valuable political ideal, then you should 
follow the principles of justice. 
Actually the Rawlsian social contract is better 
understood as a social agreement on principles of 
justice which people would make in a well-ordered 
society. This social agreement represents a political 
ideal which Rawls believes, that is, an agreement 
which reasonable citizens would make while they 
concern about how to cooperate with each other fairly. 
